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Abstract: Recent global developments lead companies to include into their strategic plans not only 
economic sustainability but environmental and social sustainability as well. Companies have been 
investing in environmental and social sustainability to meet stakeholder demand and/or regulatory 
demands. Considering this as a market mechanism, we view the sustainability actions of companies as 
interrelated strategic decisions and propose a Stackelberg game to model the effects of competition for 
sustainability and sustainability spillovers over the sustainability outcomes of companies. We provide 
equilibrium solutions for the one leader, two followers game over different intervals of competition 
levels and spillover rates. Using a numerical example, we observe how the sustainability investments 
and net benefits change as competition levels and spillover rates change and identify the competition-
spillover regions, where each player invests the most and has the advantage in terms of benefit. We 
discuss implications for both the companies and the policy makers.  
Key Words: Game theory, Corporate sustainability, Competition, Spillovers, Stackelberg game 
1. Introduction 
Sustainability research has addressed different mechanisms behind firm behavior regarding their 
sustainability initiatives and the resulting financial outcomes from different theoretic lenses. Proponents 
of the Stakeholder Theory (Donaldson and Preston, 1995, Berman et al. 1999) suggest that sustainability 
initiatives such as engaging in product differentiation in terms of environment friendly product 
characteristic, signaling corporate citizenship, or communication of commitment to sustainability to 
consumers will lead to increased reputation and market share, which in turn will enhance financial 
performance (Preston and O’Bannon, 1997, Hall and Wagner, 2012).  
From a different perspective, the Resource Based View (RBV) of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984) suggests 
that sustainability initiatives lead to cost advantages since they improve processes and practices of a 
company (Cristmann, 2000, Darnall et al., 2008, Schoenherr and Talluri, 2013). Examples for 
sustainability initiatives, which lead to a decrease in operation costs, are product design for environment, 
responsible sourcing and conservation of natural resources, energy consumption and greenhouse gas 
emissions reduction, pollution reduction, waste reduction, inventory management and warehousing, 
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packaging and mode of transportation, and extended producer responsibility (Hitchcock and Willard, 
2009). There is plenty of empirical evidence on the positive impact of sustainability initiatives on 
operation costs. Positive and significant impact of pollution prevention and waste reduction on cost 
(Schoenherr, 2012), positive impact of process innovation, which converts a waste stream into a useful 
and saleable by-product, on the original products’ costs (Lee, 2012), cost advantages of intermodal 
transportation, which incorporate the environmental impact of transportation and inventory (Battini et 
al., 2014), interrelationships between capacity utilization, customer satisfaction, energy consumption 
reduction, and costs in a product recovery setting (Mangala et al., 2013) are examples to name a few. 
As stated by Mendoza and Clemen (2013), sustainability initiatives such as recycling or reducing energy 
consumption (which lead to cost reduction) may generate more direct net benefit compared to corporate 
social responsibility initiatives, which enhance the social infrastructure. While the latter increases the 
reputation of the company, improves consumer goodwill, and generates financial performance through 
the mechanisms of the Stakeholder Theory, the former improves financial performance through the 
mechanisms of RBV and Stakeholder Theory. If sustainability initiatives such as recycling or energy 
consumption reduction are communicated to the stakeholders, reputation should improve as well. Thus, 
albeit the different motivations such as moral or value–based motivations, legitimacy concerns, 
managerial–agency–based motivations, institutional motivations, responsiveness to activists and/or 
strategic motivations (Carroll et al., 2016), adopting sustainability initiatives generate directly or 
indirectly favorable financial outcomes. Moreover, stakeholder engagement and transparency around 
sustainability performance lead to a better access to finance and, firms with better sustainability 
performance face, on average, lower capital constraints (Cheng et al., 2014). Investors believe that solid 
sustainability performance of a company leads to improved revenue performance, reduced risk, and 
lower cost of capital (Unruh, 2016).  
Academic research provides evidence supporting that companies investing in sustainability especially 
in environmental sustainability gain competitive advantage (Golicic and Smith, 2013, Yadav, Han and 
Kim, 2017). Eccles et al. (2014) report that high sustainability companies outperform the low 
sustainability ones in terms of both stock market and accounting measures. Further evidence comes from 
Unruh (2016); organizations that have made a sustainability related business model change are twice 
likely to report profit from sustainability than those that haven’t. Furthermore, extensive literature 
review studies (e.g. Peloza, 2009, Margolis et al., 2009, Grewatsch and Kleindienst, 2017) concur that 
empirical evidence predominantly supports the positive link. Since both empirical evidence as well as 
anecdotal evidence assert that sustainability initiatives lead to economic benefits, research attention has 
recently begun to shift from whether it pays to be good to when and under what circumstances (Orlitzky 
et al. 2011, Grewatsch and Kleindienst, 2017). 
We aim to identify when and under what circumstances companies benefit from sustainability adoption. 
However, both conceptually and empirically, the literature views sustainability adoption mostly from a 
micro perspective, whereas companies make these decisions in a macro business environment. Hofer et 
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al. (2012) also point out to the paucity of research incorporating the effect of competition on 
implementation of environmental management (EM) activities. They advocate that EM has strategic and 
competitive importance and present empirical evidence that firms compete in terms of EM activities. 
Similarly, we advocate that sustainability actions of a company impact its marketplace and vice versa. 
Our purpose is to shed some light on how strategic interactions between companies affect their 
sustainability actions and incorporate the effect of competition into our analysis. 
We propose a game theoretical model for sustainability interactions. We introduce the concept of 
“sustainability market,” which is the competitive environment that can award or penalize firms 
according to whether they invest in sustainability or not. We refer to the situation that a firm undertakes 
significant amount of sustainability related activities as the single firm’s entrance in to the sustainability 
market. Stakeholders can observe how and when firms incorporate sustainability in their products, 
processes, and strategies. We argue that entry into the sustainability market by investing in sustainable 
practices is valued by the stakeholders and potentially increase the financial returns (if the return to 
sustainability is positive).   
Depending on the nature of the sustainability initiatives undertaken by the firm, stakeholder payment to 
sustainability would occur in various forms such as: i) increased willingness to pay a price premium, 
increase in favorable purchase decisions, improved brand value through environmentally friendly 
product mixes and corporate social responsibility, reduction in production costs through operational 
efficiencies and improved workplace productivity ii) increase the firm valuation in the eyes of the 
investor iii) easy access to financing and iv) tax advantage. The firm’s collection of the returns from the 
sustainability efforts, however, depends on whether the competitor/fellow firms also perform 
same/similar or different sustainable actions.  
It is likely that different sustainability actions will have different effects on the overall competition in 
the market (Galbreth and Ghosh, 2013). The decomposition of competition into negative effect and 
positive effect (spillover) provide better understanding how strategic interactions influence the 
sustainability decisions of companies. 
i) negative effect of competition 
If the entry decision of company j changes the expectation of stakeholders from company i (for instance 
for a sustainable version of the product or a lower price) then the net benefit of company i will decrease. 
Company i either does not change her product offering regarding sustainability or price and loses 
demand and market share or decides to adapt to the shifting expectations of stakeholders and incurs new 
costs. The negative effect of competition in the sustainability market is in line with the conventional 
effect of competition on market entry which has been established by industrial organization literature 
for a long time. The industrial organization literature has established that the stakeholder valuation for 
a particular action decreases as more companies take similar actions.  Companies implement 
sustainability actions to differentiate themselves from their competitors. However, as more companies 
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engage in sustainability activities, the competitive advantage provided by the sustainability initiative 
decreases. 
ii) positive effect of competition- spillover 
It is likely that different sustainability actions will have different effects on the overall competition in 
the market (Galbreth and Ghosh, 2013). If the sustainability efforts of a company lead to an improved 
stakeholder perception of the whole industry, there may be sustainability spillovers and other companies 
may free ride the sustainability efforts of the leader company. For instance, a public education activity 
on dental health undertaken by a specific producer of toothpaste may lead to an increase in the overall 
toothpaste sales. Similarly, if a company imitates the competitors’ sustainability actions, the 
implementation cost for that company will be lower compared to the competitors’ costs. The follower 
benefits from the spillovers without bearing the full cost of the investments and again that company free 
rides the sustainability efforts of her competitors.  
To address these dynamics, we develop a sequential single leader-multiple follower game and model 
the effect of competition level and spillover rate on the sustainability outcomes and net benefits of the 
leader and followers. We provide the analytical equilibrium solutions and examine how the leader’s 
sustainability efforts affect the followers’ sustainability activities for all possible values competition 
level and spillover rate can take in their respective domains.  We demonstrate the conditions, when the 
leader attains the first mover advantage and the followers attain the late mover advantage. 
The model results suggest that when negative effect of competition is greater than the positive effect of 
spillovers only the leader invests in sustainability and the first mover receives the whole stakeholder 
payment in the sustainability market, since her competitors have not yet invested in sustainability. In 
this case, the accumulation of know-how and experience of the leader may make it hard for the rivals to 
replicate her sustainability investments immediately. However, in the presence of substantial 
sustainability spillovers, the leader’s position is challenged by new comers. As more companies invest 
in sustainability, in order to maintain competitive advantage, the leader needs to continue to innovate 
further, otherwise she will lose her competitive advantage. Nevertheless, when the positive effect of 
spillovers is less than the negative effect of competition the leader and both followers invest in 
sustainability and the second follower benefits more than the leader. The late adopter has an advantage, 
since she benefits from cumulative spillovers- increased net benefits due to market expansion caused by 
improved stakeholder perception of the whole industry and decreased implementation costs. The 
intermediate adopter fails to follow a clear strategy and cannot gain advantage over her competitors. 
By modeling strategic sustainability interactions in an oligopolistic market, we contribute to the ongoing 
debate about the impact of industry structure on sustainability and financial outcomes generated by 
sustainability. Furthermore, we show the effect of competition and spillovers on the overall 
sustainability outcome of the market. The results regarding the total market sustainability outcome 




The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents brief literature review on competitive 
interactions between companies regarding their sustainability actions such as introduction of a 
sustainable product, reduction of pollution, implementation of sustainable operations practices or 
closing the supply chain loop. Section 3 develops the theoretical basis for analyzing the influence of 
competition on sustainability actions and financial outcomes, introduces the game theoretic model which 
allows the sustainability actions to be interdependent among the firms and provides the analytical 
solutions. Section 4 describes and discusses the results and their implications by means of illustrative 
examples. Section 5 concludes with future research opportunities. 
2. Literature  
Game theory is suitable for analyzing situations in which the decisions of companies affect each 
company’s benefit. We distinguish between studies where cooperative and non-cooperative game 
players are considered. The cooperative game-theoretic models consider the fair distribution of benefits 
and costs among stakeholders such as the government, the local authorities, the companies, and the 
community. In multi-stakeholder cooperative situations, such as life cycle management, water resource 
sharing or waste management, the outcome is affected by the decisions made by every player (Karmperis 
et al., 2013). Waste management decisions such as selecting a new landfill site (Cheng et al, 2003), 
division of waste management costs (Moretti, 2004), waste disposal (Jørgensen, 2010), selection of 
sustainable waste treatment options (Soltani et al., 2016) and water resource management decisions such 
as sanitation (Leoneti and Pires, 2017) have been modeled as cooperative games. 
Non-cooperative game players make decisions independently from each other. According to Ruf et al. 
(2001) companies have two choices to meet the stakeholder demand for increasing corporate 
sustainability performance, namely, compliance or active support. They assert that if a company is 
proactive and changes its business processes in order to become more sustainable, then it will gain 
competitive advantage over its competitors who are being reactive towards stakeholder demand. Static 
games such as price or quantity competitions, new product introduction, and competition in 
remanufacturing can be modeled as non-cooperative games.  
Moraga-González and Padrón-Fumero (2002) consider a duopoly market with product differentiation, 
where consumers are concerned with the emissions. Rodriguez-Ibeas (2007) studies a standard vertical 
product differentiation model, where firms simultaneously choose their prices. He assumes that the 
polluting firm has cost advantage over the non-polluting firm. If the consumers are not sensitive to the 
environment, due to her cost advantage, the polluting firm decreases her price to capture the whole 
market. The polluting firm’s output decreases with increasing environmental awareness. However, until 
a critical level of environmental awareness is reached the polluting firm still benefits due to the cost 
advantage. Kopel (2009) considers the effect of spillovers in a duopoly setting with product 
differentiation and model a Cournot game, where leader and follower compete for demanded quantities 
which depend on both prices and the sustainability activities of both players. 
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Orsdemir et al. (2014) study a quantity competition between an Original Equipment Manufacturer 
(OEM) and independent remanufacturer (IR), where the interdependence is twofold. (i) Remanufactured 
product’s cost and quality level depend on the new product’s quality level. (ii) Similarly, according to 
Majumder and Groenevelt (2001) the end-of-life products available for IR are limited to the new 
products supplied by the OEM. They investigate the impact of remanufacturing and quality choice on 
consumer surplus and social surplus and find that IR’s entry decreases the consumer surplus and social 
surplus. Moreover, from an environmental perspective it is more favorable that the OEM 
remanufactures. 
Sabbaghia et al. (2016) model the interactions between consumers and OEM, which remanufactures 
returned electrical and electronic equipment. Since returned goods are inputs to the remanufacturing 
operation, the OEM has to control the rate and timing of returns. In order to do so, the OEM rewards 
consumers for participating in the take back program. In the proposed game-theoretic model the 
consumers decide on their optimal storage times while OEM decides on the optimal value of the 
incentive reward. Similarly, Esenduran et al. (2017) study the effect of take-back regulations on the 
OEM and IR decisions, consumer surplus and the OEM’s profit. They find that although stringent 
collection regulations are in favor of the OEM, they lead to decreased remanufacturing.  
Sequential order of moves such as incumbency, sequential entry, R&D races, can be captured by the 
Stackelberg model (Huck et al., 2001). Sustainability decisions such as disclosure, outsourcing, new 
product entry, supply chain coordination, price and quantity competition in a remanufacturing setting 
are modeled as repeated games. In disclosure models, a firm decides to disclose information on its 
sustainability activities and the opponent decides to strike or not. In the sequential model proposed by 
Li et al. (1997) the market reacts to both disclosure and strike decisions. Li et al. (1997) report that the 
environmental performance of a company decreases as the disclosure level increases. Sengupta (2015) 
considers a game, where companies signal their environmental performance. In accordance to the 
finding of Li et al. (1997) they observe that mandatory disclosure of environmental performance 
decreases investment in clean technologies. Mendoza and Clemen (2013) formulate the outsourcing 
decision as a Stackelberg game, where in the first stage the sustainability buyer decides on the level of 
economic or technical support to incentivize sellers’ efforts and in the second stage two sustainability 
sellers decide on their effort levels. Plambeck and Wang (2009) formulate and compare a monopoly 
model and a duopoly model to study the effects of various waste regulations on the new product 
introduction process, quantity of e-waste, social welfare, consumer surplus, and manufacturer profit.  
Conrad (2005) models a spatial duopoly market, where equilibrium prices and market shares are affected 
by consumers’ awareness of environment. At the first stage, companies choose product characteristics 
and at the second stage companies decide on the price. Liu et al. (2012) propose a dynamic two-stage 
game of production and retail competition that incorporates consumer environmental awareness. In the 
first stage, the manufacturers decide on the environmental improvement and wholesale price. In the 
second stage the retailers set the price of the product. They study the impact of consumers’ 
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environmental awareness on price competition under the assumptions that production of eco-friendly 
products is more costly and consumers are willing to pay higher prices for more eco-friendly products. 
Xu et al. (2017) analyze a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one supplier and one manufacturer 
and model their optimal pricing and carbon emissions intensity decisions as a Stackelberg game. They 
incorporate the effect of environmental awareness and technological spillovers into their analysis and 
compare centralized and decentralized supply chains.  
Majumder and Groenevelt (2001) model a two- stage duopoly game in a remanufacturing setting, where 
players compete for resource allocation as well as price and quantity. In the first period, the OEM 
produces and sells new items. Only a fraction of these items is returned and available for the OEM and 
the IR to remanufacture in the second period. Hence, in the second period each player’s competitive 
response depends on this state variable. They utilize a demand function such that the quantity sold by 
each player depends on both his own price and the competitor’s price. Jacobs and Subramanian (2012) 
study the effect of regulations on the amount of collected and recycled end of life cycle products and 
the associated profits in integrated and decentralized supply chains. They propose a two stage model, 
where the supplier sets the wholesale price and recycling rate and the manufacturer chooses the total 
quantity as a best response. They show that sharing the responsibility for product recovery between the 
stages can improve total supply chain profit. 
Besley and Ghatak (2007) study a setting where companies compete in a Bertrand-like fashion. The 
company decides to seek profit maximization or to be socially responsible, whereas the consumer 
decides which firm to purchase from or whether not to buy the good at all. Although the authors analyze 
product market, they assert that the basic idea applies to labor markets (labor donation), or capital 
markets (ethical investment) and conclude that more responsible firms earn higher profits, as a 
reputational premium to support good behavior. 
Kopel et al. (2014) introduce a Stackelberg game, where competitors make a strategic decision on 
whether they are profit maximizing companies or socially responsible companies in the first stage and 
in the second stage a quantity competition takes place. They introduce the consumer surplus into the 
objective function in order to represent socially responsible companies. In the second stage they 
introduce different reservation prices for profit maximizing and socially responsible companies to 
capture the vertical product differentiation. If both companies have the same costs, the socially 
responsible company attains more benefits compared to the profit maximizing company. Manasakis et. 
al.  (2014) consider a Cournot game, where companies signal their corporate social responsibility 
performance by hiring a manager who is publicly known to be socially responsible. In turn, consumers 
increase their willingness to pay for this firm’s product which then obtains a competitive advantage in 
the market and increases its profits. Similar to Kopel et al. (2014), Lambertini and Tampieri (2015) 
account for consumer surplus when formulating the objective function and study a Cournot oligopoly 
with pollution, where companies decide on their sustainability strategy. They find that the sustainable 
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firm obtains higher profits than its profit-seeking competitors, and generates a higher level of social 
welfare.  
There is a wide range of studies modeling strategic interactions regarding sustainability decisions. 
However, the research questions addressed even in the studies that relate most to this study as discussed 
above, differ substantially. They model sustainability interactions, where companies decide to produce 
a more sustainable version of a homogeneous product and compete in quantities or prices, which are 
decisions more on the operational and tactical level. Whereas sustainability at firm level covers wide 
range of topics from environmentally friendly product mix and lean sustainable operations to corporate 
social responsibility and employee workplace satisfaction. This broader definition of sustainability from 
our perspective is a part of the firm’s strategy. Some of these areas might but in general most would not 
be directly tied to the operation/production level of the firm per se. Thus we do not link the sustainable 
investment level of a firm directly to the production level of the firm and aim to propose a model 
sufficiently general, which can cover the wide range of topics associated with sustainability. 
We model sustainability interactions, where there is a demand for sustainability from various 
stakeholders and a payoff from being sustainable. The companies compete for stakeholder payments 
and decide on their sustainability levels, which maximize their net benefit by taking the opponents 
actions into account. As a result, we propose a game theoretical model to describe the effects of 
competition and spillovers on the sustainability initiatives and net benefits generated by these 
sustainability initiatives. We distinguish between the negative and positive effect of competition.  
In classical entry models the entry of company j into a market decreases the net benefit of the company 
i, since the companies will compete for the market shares. As more companies enter the market, net 
benefits decrease. Similarly, as more companies invest into sustainability-enter the sustainability 
market- a decrease in net benefits may be expected. All competitors -the leader as well as the followers- 
are influenced by the negative effect of competition. Thus, the follower's sustainability choice has 
negative effect on the leader and predecessor followers’ return of sustainability. 
Distinctly, competition in sustainability influences the net benefits not only negatively, but also 
positively in terms of spillovers. Spillovers may occur twofold. i) If the sustainability efforts of company 
j lead to an improved stakeholder perception of the whole industry, the whole market may expand and 
company i receive increased net benefit as well. ii) If company j invests in sustainability initiatives 
earlier compared to company i, company i can imitate these sustainability initiatives and increased net 
benefit due to decreased implementation costs. Both spillovers have sequential nature within an echelon: 
The sustainability action of the leader/ predecessor follower has to occur first, so that the stakeholder 
perception of industry improves leading to market expansion.  Similarly, sustainability action of the 
leader/ predecessor follower has to occur first, so that the followers can imitate the action leading to 
lower implementation costs. We assume that spillovers occur from leader to followers and from 
predecessor follower to successor followers. We propose a sequential model in an oligopoly setting, 
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provide analytical solutions and quantify the effect of competition and spillovers using illustrative 
examples for better visual representation. 
3. The Game Theoretical Model  
In this section, we conceptualize sustainability actions of companies as strategic interactions and model 
the competition among companies in an oligopolistic market. The goal of the focal company is to 
maximize the net benefit obtained from sustainability considering the sustainability actions of her 
competitors. We start our analysis by constructing a net benefit function. According to the RBV 
companies obtain benefit from investing in sustainability. The supply-side perspective points out that 
companies have to allocate resources in order to satisfy the demand for sustainability. Thus, we can 
modify the microeconomic concepts of production and cost functions to include sustainability-related 
inputs, which incur costs and outputs, which generate benefit (McWilliams et al., 2001). We provide the 
notation used in Table 1.  
Table 1: Notation 
i: company index, i=1,…..,N 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖:  level of sustainability initiatives of company i, 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0 
𝒘𝒘𝑁𝑁 𝑖𝑖⁄  :  vector for all players’ level of sustainability initiatives, excluding company i. 
r𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 , ,𝒘𝒘𝑁𝑁 𝑖𝑖⁄   �:  
benefit of undertaking sustainability at level 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 given competitors’ sustainability 
levels 
c𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 , ,𝒘𝒘𝑁𝑁 𝑖𝑖⁄   �:  
implementation cost of undertaking sustainability at level 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 given competitors’ 
sustainability levels 
𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖:  fixed amount of fines, if company i does not comply with the regulations 
Π𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 , ,𝒘𝒘𝑁𝑁 𝑖𝑖⁄   �:  
Net benefit of undertaking sustainability at level 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 given competitors’ sustainability 
levels 
𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿:  level of sustainability initiatives of the leader 
𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖:  level of sustainability initiatives of follower i 
𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖�:  stakeholder payments for the leader for sustainability level 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 
𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖�:  stakeholder payments for follower i for sustainability level 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 
a:  initial willingness of the stakeholder to pay for sustainability initiatives, 𝑎𝑎 > 0 
b:  rate at which the willingness to pay decreases as sustainability initiatives increase, 𝑏𝑏 > 0 
d: marginal cost for sustainability investment for both the leader and the followers, 𝑑𝑑 >0 
𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖: sustainability spill overs for follower i, 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 ∈ [0,1] 
𝛾𝛾:  sustainability spill overs at constant rate for all followers, 𝛾𝛾 ∈ [0,1] 
𝜃𝜃:  level of competition, 𝜃𝜃 ∈ [0, 1] 
𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 �∑ 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗
𝑁𝑁−1
𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖 �𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿�:  
follower i’ s reaction to arbitrary sustainability levels by other followers subject to 
the leaders sustainability level 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 
w𝑖𝑖∗:  player i’ s optimal investments given arbitrary sustainability levels by other players 
𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿  ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖�:  benefit of the leader from undertaking sustainability initiatives 
𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿  ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖�:  benefit of the follower from undertaking sustainability initiatives 
𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖�:  cost of the leader from undertaking sustainability initiatives 
𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖�:  cost of follower i from undertaking sustainability initiatives 
Π𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 �𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿�𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖��: net benefit of the leader from undertaking sustainability initiatives 
Π𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 �𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖�𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖��: net benefit of the follower from undertaking sustainability initiatives 
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The companies’ objective is to choose the level of sustainability 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖≥ 0 that maximizes their net benefit 
function subject to competitors’ sustainability levels. The company i decides on the best action by 
anticipating the actions of its competitors.  
The net benefit function of the focal company i is calculated as: 
Π𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖, ,𝒘𝒘𝑁𝑁 𝑖𝑖⁄ � = r𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖, ,𝒘𝒘𝑁𝑁 𝑖𝑖⁄ � − c𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖, ,𝒘𝒘𝑁𝑁 𝑖𝑖⁄ �    (1) 
On the one hand, companies may decide to invest in sustainability voluntarily. These companies 
undertake sustainability initiatives, if their expected benefits exceed the expected costs of sustainability, 
since they are assumed to be rational decision makers. Thus, company i undertakes sustainability 
initiatives voluntarily, if the net benefits Π𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖, ,𝒘𝒘𝑁𝑁 𝑖𝑖⁄ �> 0. On the other hand, if companies are 
coerced into investing in sustainability, either they comply with the new regulations or they face fines 
for not adopting. For these companies the sustainability investment decisions boil down to whether their 
expected net benefits exceed the fines for not adopting. Thus, company i complies with regulations and 
undertakes sustainability initiatives, if the net benefits Π𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖, ,𝒘𝒘𝑁𝑁 𝑖𝑖⁄ � > 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖. We model sustainability 
interactions of companies that undertake sustainability initiatives voluntarily. However, the model 
applies also to companies that are coerced into investing in sustainability. Simply the fixed amount of 
fines 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 should be incorporated into the analysis as well. 
To obtain closed-form solutions and discuss the implication of different parameters, we use specific 
functional forms. On the one hand Piga (2002) predicts that in oligopolistic markets, in equilibrium, 
firms which supply sustainable goods reap ‘abnormal’ profits. On the other hand, Mc Williams et al. 
(2006) claim that the costs of sustainability balance out the benefits generated from sustainability and 
advocate that for both oligopoly and monopolistic competition in equilibrium, the net benefits of firms 
that implement sustainability is the same as the net benefits of the firms that do not implement 
sustainability. Based on the evidence provided by empirical sustainability research, we suppose that 
sustainability generates abnormal profits and expect that the increase in net benefits will deteriorate as 
the firm increases its level of sustainability. Thus, we assume that the net benefit function is an increasing 
concave function in sustainability efforts.  
The source of the benefits can be twofold. (i) Based on the Stakeholder Theory, when a company invests 
in sustainability and these efforts are visible by the stakeholders, then the company is perceived as 
sustainable and the stakeholders provide incentives such as increased demand, willingness to pay a price 
premium, tax benefit or better financing opportunities. (ii) Based on the RBV, sustainability initiatives 
lead to process improvement and increase in employee productivity, which in return lead to reduction 
in operating costs.  
However, both these benefits are expected to diminish. As more companies become sustainable, 
stakeholders no longer differentiate between companies based on sustainability and the stakeholder 
incentives decrease. Similarly, the reduction in operating costs is expected to go down as firms increase 
their level of sustainability. In this model, we do not distinguish between benefits due to stakeholder 
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incentives and cost reduction, and assume that they both diminish as sustainability efforts increase. 
Therefore, we assume that the benefit function r𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝒘𝒘𝑁𝑁 𝑖𝑖⁄ �is an increasing concave function in 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖, 
and the marginal increase in benefits will deteriorate as the firm increases its level of sustainability. This 
assumption is in line with previous literature as well. There are plenty of studies utilizing a concave 
functional form to model the return to various sustainability decisions   
Moraga-González and Padrón-Fumero (2002) model the introduction of a more sustainable version of a 
homogeneous product and subsequent price competition and assume that the technology for the 
sustainable variant exhibits decreasing returns. Plambeck and Wang (2009) study effect of regulations 
on the new product introduction process, quantity of collected and recycled end of life cycle products 
and waste and assume that the marginal return on time and expenditure is decreasing. Jacobs and 
Subramanian (2012) evaluate different policy decisions and propose that the profit of the integrated 
supply chain under no regulation is jointly concave in the total produced quantity and recycling rates. 
Sabbaghia et al. (2016) study decisions on the rate and timing of end of life cycle product returns and 
define the utility function of OEM as the difference between the profit obtained from remanufactured 
products and the incentive values paid to the consumers for returning the end- of life cycle goods. Their 
model results suggest that the OEM utility is concave in incentives.  
In all the aforementioned studies, the marginal return on sustainability efforts (e.g. technology for the 
sustainable variant, time and expenditure to collect end of life cycle products, recycling rates and 
incentive values paid to the consumers for returning the end- of life cycle goods) is decreasing. Mendoza 
and Clemen (2013) model decision on outsourcing of recovery activities and assume that the profit 
function is an increasing and concave function. They elaborate on the logic behind their assumption; in 
order to achieve a maximum level of benefit companies invest in sustainability projects with a higher 
direct benefit per unit of effort first and remark that this assumption is consistent with widely used 
approaches such as the McKinsey Abatement Curve (Enkvist et al. 2007). Thus, the assumption of the 
net benefit profit functions being strictly concave with respect to the sustainability efforts is standard 
assumption, which we adopt as well. 
The effect of competition on the implementation costs of company i is not straightforward as the effect 
of competition on its benefits. c𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖, ,𝒘𝒘𝑁𝑁 𝑖𝑖⁄ � is not only affected by the actions of the focal company 
but also by the actions of the competitors. For example, if a company simply imitates its competitors’ 
sustainability initiatives, the implementation cost for that company may be lower compared to the 
competitors’ costs. We expect that the marginal cost of implementation will increase as the level of 
sustainability initiatives increase. Thus, the implementation costs of sustainability initiatives 
c𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖, ,𝒘𝒘𝑁𝑁 𝑖𝑖⁄ �  are assumed to be increasing and convex in 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖, when learning effects1 are neglected.  
                                                          
1 The learning effects are based on the concept that, as a task is performed repetitively, the time required to 
perform the task decreases. Similarly, the incremental cost of sustainability implementation decreases. 
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Liu et al. (2012) point out that it is well-known that environmental improvement has an increasing 
marginal cost. Each additional increment of pollution prevention is more difficult, and hence costlier to 
achieve, which is also associated with the phenomenon of diminishing returns. 
3.1. Sequential Single Leader- Multiple Follower Game with spillovers 
According to Ferrier et al. (1999) there is a time lag between the observation of a firm’s sustainability 
action and the response of its competitor. In his Harvard Business Review article Unruh [2010] presents 
anecdotal evidence of companies investing in sustainability because industry peers already invested in 
sustainability (Unruh, 2010). Furthermore, Hofer et al (2012) suggest that sustainability activities are 
not synchronous and the competitive moves of the focal company and her competitors should be 
analyzed over time.  Matisoff [2015] claims that the sustainability behavior of industry leaders changes 
the sustainability behavior of followers for the better and draws attention to the evidence supporting 
dissemination of best practices across the industry in the sustainability literature. 
Drawing on the literature and our practical observations we anticipate, that companies make 
sustainability decisions based on the actions of fellow companies and in a sequential manner. Thus, we 
prefer to model sustainability interactions as Stackelberg game instead of a simultaneous game. 
However, the effect of competition remains ambiguous, unless opposing effects of competition are 
decomposed.  On the one hand the stakeholder valuation for a sustainability initiative decreases as more 
companies take similar actions. On the other hand, as pioneer companies invest in sustainability 
initiatives they transform the market, so that the marginal return of sustainability is higher for followers 
compared to pioneers.  
The variable wi may indicate that company i invested a certain amount in making its products be easily 
disassembled for remanufacturing, or in process improvement in terms of energy, water or virgin 
material efficiency, which also leads to cost efficiency, or company i invested a certain amount in a 
corporate social responsibility project and wi may also indicate the effort the company i puts to comply 
with international human rights laws, so that it is selected as a supplier to international companies. Will 
the competitors benefit from the sustainability actions of the leading firm through an already improved 
customer perception of the industry or will they undertake similar initiatives themselves may be at a 
lower cost? How will this affect the leader and other competitors?  
In the first stage, the leader decides on her sustainability level by anticipating her competitors’ 
sustainability levels. In the subsequent stages the followers observe the leader’s and their predecessor 
followers’ sustainability investments and decide on their optimum sustainability level. This timing of 
the game allows us to make assumptions regarding the direction of the spillovers. We assume that 
spillovers occur from leader to followers and from predecessor follower to successor follower. In our 
model, the sustainability activities of the followers decrease the leader’s return generated by 
sustainability investments, whereas the effect of the sustainability activities of the leader and the 
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predecessor followers on the follower’s return depends on the relation between spillovers and level of 
competition. In our model, we consider the time in the following manner:  
We consider N firms with identical constant implementation costs d. They make sequential choices of 
actions; firm 1 first, firm N last. In the first stage of the game, the leader (firm 1) chooses 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 by 
anticipating the cumulative response of all followers. In the second stage, the follower 1 (firm 2) 
observes 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 and decides on her level of sustainability investments, 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 anticipating the opponents’ 
sustainability investment 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗 , 𝑗𝑗 = 3, … ,𝑁𝑁. In the N
th stage, the last follower (firm N) observes 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 and 
the cumulative sustainability investments of the opponents ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗
𝑁𝑁−1
𝑗𝑗=2  and decides on her sustainability 
investments, 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁 .  
An alternative model, where in the first stage of the game the leader decides on her sustainability 
investments 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 by anticipating the cumulative response of all followers, and in the second stage 
followers decide on their sustainability investments  𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗 simultaneously, may also be considered. 
However, this model is trivial, since the cumulative response of the followers will be equal to the 
response of the follower calculated in the sequential duopoly model as per,  ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗
𝑁𝑁
𝑗𝑗=2 = 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹. Moreover, 
the sustainability investments of the leader in an oligopolistic market would be equal to the sustainability 
investments of the leader in a duopolistic market. On the one hand, if all followers are affected from the 




, 𝑗𝑗 = 2, … ,𝑁𝑁. On the other hand, if the followers are affected differently from the spillovers 
due to their company characteristics, their sustainability investments should be proportional to their 
spillover rates. 
Henceforth, we will proceed with the model presented in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Time line for Sequential Single Leader- Multiple Follower Game 
In the classical game theoretical models, the level of competition is derived by the market shares of the 
companies. The corporate sustainability interactions model in this study, we use the following 
assumptions: 
i) Stakeholders’ demand is for sustainability, and companies supply for this demand. Thus, 






sustainability and should be considered like “amount of supply” for the demanded goods or 
services in the classical sense.  
ii) Competition is not for the market share for the products or services of the companies offer, 
but to meet the demand for sustainability. One can argue that competition among companies 
for sustainability is not entirely independent of competition among companies for their product 
and/or service offerings due to the nature of sustainability. Nonetheless, our sustainability 
construct can be considered as a homogeneous “good” supplied by the companies. Due to the 
homogeneous goods assumption, the effect of competition is perceived by both the leader and 
followers and is constant among all players.  
iii) We expect that the spillover effects from leader to followers will decrease over time, while the 
spillovers from predecessor to successor followers will increase. 
iv) We assume that the rate of decrease in spillover effects from leader to followers and the rate 
of increase in spillover from predecessor followers to successor followers are at the same 
degree, and the cumulative spillover for arbitrary follower j does not change. 
To clarify assumptions iii and iv, assume sustainability spillovers occur only from leader to followers. 
In that case, follower 1 is expected to be benefitting more from spillovers compared to successor 
followers. The spillovers are expected to diminish over time. Thus 𝛾𝛾1 > 𝛾𝛾2 > ⋯ > 𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁−1 > 𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁 ≥ 0,  and 
the assumption of spillovers occurring only from leader to followers becomes unrealistic. Spillovers 𝛾𝛾𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗 
occur from leader to follower j and spillovers 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 may occur among followers for 𝑖𝑖 < 𝑗𝑗. For example, 
the cumulative spillover for follower j would be the summation of the spillover effect from the leader, 
𝛾𝛾𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗 and the spillover effects from all the predecessors to 𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗. Thus, total spillover for 𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗 is denoted as 
𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 = 𝛾𝛾𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗 + ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 
𝑗𝑗−1
𝑖𝑖=2 . It is reasonable to expect that the spillover effects from leader to followers will 
decrease over time.  The spillovers from predecessor to successor followers, however, should increase 
as more followers join the market. Late adopters benefit more from spillovers occurring from 
predecessor followers compared to early adopters, since inter- follower spillovers accumulate.  
3.2. Sequential Single Leader-Multiple Follower Game with Leader-Follower-Follower 
Spillovers at a Constant Rate 
As explained in the previous section, the sustainability leader and the followers compete for the 
sustainability demand. Since stakeholder’s reward the companies for their sustainability efforts, 
companies aim to maximize their net benefits by choosing the optimum sustainability level with respect 
to their competitors’ sustainability actions. Thus, our model resembles a quantity competition, which is 
widely studied in the IO literature. We refer to the reward received from sustainability investments as 
stakeholder payments, which correspond to the price in the classical Stackelberg model. As the number 
of players investing in sustainability increases, sustainability payments are expected to decrease. We 
formulate the stakeholder payments of the leader, follower 1 and, follower 2 as: 
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𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2� = 𝑎𝑎 − 𝑏𝑏(𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 + 𝜃𝜃(𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 + 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2))   (2) 
𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹1�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2� = 𝑎𝑎 − 𝑏𝑏(𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 + (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 + 𝜃𝜃𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2)  (3) 
𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹2�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2� = 𝑎𝑎 − 𝑏𝑏(𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2 + (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)(𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 + 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿))  (4) 
An increase in the competition level affects stakeholder payments of the leader and follower negatively. 
We assume that the spillovers occur from leader to followers and from predecessor follower to successor 
followers. If sustainability investments of the leader are successful, the follower may free ride the 
leader’s sustainability efforts. Either the stakeholder perception of the whole industry shifts due to the 
efforts of the leader and the follower benefits from increased stakeholder payment or the follower 
imitates the leader’s sustainability actions and benefits from the spillovers without bearing the full 
investment costs. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the marginal cost for sustainability 
investments are constant for both the sustainability leader and the follower and denote it by d. We do 
not distinguish between the nature of spillovers (increased stakeholder payment or decrease in 
sustainability investment costs) and incorporate the twofold influence of spillovers as a positive effect 
on followers’ benefits; an increase in sustainability spillovers increases the followers’ stakeholder 
payments. The benefit from sustainability initiatives is calculated as 
𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿, 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2� = 𝑝𝑝�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿      (5) 
𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹1
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿, 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2� = 𝑝𝑝�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2�𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1      (6) 
𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹2
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2� = 𝑝𝑝�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2�𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2    (7) 
Leader’s decision problem is to choose the level of sustainability initiatives 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿≥0 that maximizes her 
net benefit function given as: 
Π𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 �𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿�𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 ,  𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2�� = 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 ,  𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2� − 𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 ,  𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2� = �𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 ,  𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2� − 𝑑𝑑�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 (8) 
Then, each follower’s decision problem is to choose the level of sustainability investment 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 that 
maximizes her benefit function. Thus follower 1 and follower 2’s objective functions can be written as: 
Π𝐹𝐹1
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 �𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1�𝑝𝑝�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 ,  𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2�� = 𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹1
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 ,  𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2� − 𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹1
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿,  𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2� = �𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹1�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 ,  𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2� −
𝑑𝑑�𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1             (9) 
Π𝐹𝐹2
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 �𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2�𝑝𝑝�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 ,  𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2�� = 𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹2
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 ,  𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2� − 𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹2
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿,  𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2� = �𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹2�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 ,  𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2� −
𝑑𝑑�𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2            (10) 
3.2.1. Follower 2’s problem 
To solve for the backward induction outcome of this game, we first compute w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹2(𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 ,𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿), the 








𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2�𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 ,𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿� = max𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2≥0
 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2 �𝑎𝑎 − 𝑏𝑏(𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2 + (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)(𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 + 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿)) − 𝑑𝑑� 
= max
𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2≥0
  �(𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑)𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2 − 𝑏𝑏(𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)�𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 + 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿�𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2 − 𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2
2� 
Since Π𝐹𝐹2






− (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)�𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 + 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿��       (11) 
Then the optimal solution w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹2(𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 ,𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿) to (PF2), is given as 
w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = �
0      𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2 ≤ 0
𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2   𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2 > 0
        (12) 
Property 1: The optimal solution Follower 2’s problem is given by w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = max�0,𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2�. 
Proof: The proof follows easily from (12) and (PF2).  
Next, we compute w𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹1�w𝐹𝐹2
∗ ,𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿�, the optimal reaction for follower 1 given the leader’s 
sustainability level 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿. 
3.2.2. Follower 1’s Problem 





∗ ,𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿� = max𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1≥0
𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 �𝑎𝑎 − 𝑏𝑏(𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 + (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 + 𝜃𝜃w𝐹𝐹2
∗ ) − 𝑑𝑑�  
We consider two cases: 
Case 1: If  w𝐹𝐹2





∗ = 0,𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿� = [𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑 − 𝑏𝑏(𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿]𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 − 𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1
2   (13) 
Since, Π𝐹𝐹1
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1�w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 0,𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿� is strictly concave for any given 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 (see Appendix B) its maximizer 
 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 = 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹1�w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 0,𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿� can be written as: 
𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 = 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹1(w𝐹𝐹2





− (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿�      (14) 
Case 2: If  w𝐹𝐹2


















∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2 ,𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿� is strictly concave for any given 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 (see Appendix B) its maximizer  
𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 = 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹1�w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2 ,𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿� can be written as: 
𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 = 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹1�w𝐹𝐹2





− (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿�    (16a) 






        (16b) 
Remark 1. 0 ≤ (2−𝜃𝜃)
�2−𝜃𝜃(𝜃𝜃−𝛾𝛾)�
≤ 1 for any θ and γ in [0,1]. 
Remark 2. Based on Remark 1, if �𝑎𝑎−𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏
− (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿� > 0 then  𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 >  𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 > 0 
Remark 3. Based on Remark 1, if �𝑎𝑎−𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏
− (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿� ≤ 0 then 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 ≤  𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 ≤ 0 
Based on Remarks 2 and 3, Property 2 below gives the values for w𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹1�w𝐹𝐹2
∗ ,𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿� 
Property 2.  Let 𝑤𝑤� = 𝑎𝑎−𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏
− (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 . The optimal solution, w𝐹𝐹1




∗ ,𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿� is given 
as: 
𝜃𝜃 > 𝛾𝛾 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 𝛾𝛾 
𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏 −
(𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 > 0 
𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏 −
(𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 ≤ 0 
𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏 −
(𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 > 0 
𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏 −
(𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 ≤ 0 
w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 0 
w𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�   
w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2 
w𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1  
w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 0  w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2  
w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 0 
w𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 0  
w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2 
w𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�   
w𝐹𝐹1









∗ = 0 w𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1  w𝐹𝐹1
∗ =  0 
Proof. See Appendix C 
Corollary 1. Based on Property 1 and Property 2, the optimal investments for follower 1 and follower 
2 are  
 w𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 , w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2    𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 
𝑎𝑎−𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏
− (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 > 0 
w𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 0, w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 0           𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑎𝑎−𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏
− (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 ≤ 0 
 
Proof. See Appendix D. 
3.2.3. Leader’s Problem 
Next, we consider the leader’s decision problem to choose the level of sustainability initiatives 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿  ≥ 0 
that maximizes her net benefit function. 
 Π𝐿𝐿�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿�𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2� = 𝑟𝑟(𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿)− 𝑐𝑐(𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿).𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 = 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿�𝑎𝑎 − 𝑏𝑏(𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 + 𝜃𝜃(𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 + 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2))  − 𝑑𝑑�  
Since the leader can solve the followers’ problems as well as the followers, the leader should anticipate 
that the sustainability level choice 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 will be met with the cumulative reaction of followers 
∑ 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 �∑ 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗
𝑁𝑁−1




𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿�𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2� = max𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿≥0
 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 �𝑎𝑎 − 𝑏𝑏 �𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 + 𝜃𝜃�w𝐹𝐹1
∗ + w𝐹𝐹2
∗ �� − 𝑑𝑑�  
Based on Corrollary 1, we consider two cases: 
Case 1: If w𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 0, w𝐹𝐹2




∗ = 0, w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 0� = [𝑎𝑎 − 𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 − 𝑑𝑑]𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 = (𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 − 𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿2  (17) 
Since Π𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿�w𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 0, w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 0� is strictly concave for any given 𝛾𝛾,𝜃𝜃, and b (see Appendix E), its 




           (18) 
Case 2: If w𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1, w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2, then Π𝐿𝐿
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿�w𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 , w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2� 





�� − 𝑑𝑑� 
= 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 �𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑 − 𝑏𝑏 �𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 + 𝜃𝜃 �
�𝑎𝑎−𝑑𝑑−𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿(𝜃𝜃−𝛾𝛾)��8+𝛾𝛾(2+𝜃𝜃)−𝜃𝜃(4+𝜃𝜃)�
4𝑏𝑏�2−𝜃𝜃(𝜃𝜃−𝛾𝛾)�
���   (19) 
Since Π𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿�w𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 , w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2� is strictly concave for any given 𝛾𝛾, 𝜃𝜃, and 𝑏𝑏 (see Appendix E), 




    (20) 
Property 3: The optimal solution to max
𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿≥0
Π𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿




𝑏𝑏(𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾) �w𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 0, w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 0� ,Π𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤�𝐿𝐿�w𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 , w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2�� , 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝜃𝜃 > 𝛾𝛾
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎{0,𝑤𝑤�𝐿𝐿} ,                                                                                                                                 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝜃𝜃 < 𝛾𝛾
 
Proof. See Appendix F 
Corollary 2.  Based on Corollary 1 and Property 3, there exist following 2 unique Stackelberg 
equilibrium outcomes. 
𝜃𝜃 > 𝛾𝛾 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 𝛾𝛾 
𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏 −
(𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 > 0 
𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏 −
(𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 ≤ 0 
𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏 −
(𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 > 0 
𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏 −
(𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 ≤ 0 
w𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 , w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2  w𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 0, w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 0 w𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 , w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2 w𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 0, w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 0 
w𝐿𝐿∗ = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 �
𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑




 w𝐿𝐿∗ = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎{0,𝑤𝑤�𝐿𝐿} Infeasible 
w𝐿𝐿∗ = 𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 �
Π𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 �
𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏(𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾) �w𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 0, w
𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 0� ,
Π𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 �𝑤𝑤�𝐿𝐿�w𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1, w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2�
� w𝐿𝐿∗ = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎{0,𝑤𝑤�𝐿𝐿} 
 
Proof. Proof follows easily from the proofs of Corollary 1 and Property 3.  
4. Analysis and Results 




To gain better insight into the model’s outcomes, we present graphical representations for the results in 
Corollary 2. Note that these results show the equilibrium conditions for the modelled Stackelberg game. 
We consider the sustainability investments and net benefits of companies in different markets where,  
i) all firms only innovate (𝛾𝛾 = 0) versus markets where follower firms imitate the leader and one 
another (0 ≤ 𝛾𝛾 ≤1), 
ii) sustainability offerings are substitutable (0 < 𝜃𝜃 ≤1) versus markets where sustainability 
offerings are not substitutable i.e. markets are separated (𝜃𝜃 = 0), 
iii) changes in stakeholder payments have a relatively large effect on the demand for sustainability 
i.e. demand is elastic (b=0.7<1) versus changes in stakeholder payments have a relatively small 
effect on the demand for sustainability i.e. demand is inelastic (b=1.4>1). 
We show the sustainability investments and net benefits of the leader and followers for a=1, and d=0.62 
as competition (0 < 𝜃𝜃 ≤1) and spillover (0 < 𝛾𝛾 ≤1) values change over their respective domains.  The 
first result that emerges is that we can observe the same pattern for elastic and inelastic demand and 
same conclusions can be drawn regarding the effect of demand elasticity on the investment behavior of 
the players. Therefore, we discuss the likely reasons of the investment behavior for elastic demand 
(b=0.7).  
Using (11), (16) and (20), for 𝛾𝛾 = 0 and 𝜃𝜃 = 0, we get  𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 =
(𝑎𝑎−𝑑𝑑)
2𝑏𝑏
 and 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 = 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2 =
(𝑎𝑎−𝑑𝑑)
2𝑏𝑏
. If there are 
no sustainability spillovers and the sustainability offerings are not substitutable i.e. the markets are 
separated; the leaders and the followers’ sustainability investments are the same amount. For cases 
where 𝛾𝛾 > 0 and 𝜃𝜃 > 0,  the following results can be observed. For a given spillover rate, when the 
competition rate is higher than the spillover rate the leader’s investments decrease as the competition 
rate increases. As seen in Figure 2 (on the left graph), in markets where mostly all firms have to innovate 
in order to reap abnormal returns from sustainability, the leader makes the highest investment as soon 
as the competition rate exceeds (even slightly) the spillover rate and then decreases her investments as 
competition rate increases more, while the followers choose not to invest in sustainability. 
In the opposite case as shown in Figure 2 (on the right graph), in markets where follower firms mostly 
imitate the leader and one another and the competition rate is lower than the spillover rate the leader’s 
investments are much smaller and show a similar pattern i.e. they decrease as competition rate increases 
for a given spillover rate e.g. 𝛾𝛾 =1. Even though follower 1 and follower 2 have more incentives to 
invest in sustainability compared to the leader, they decrease their sustainability investments as 
competition rate increases as well. 
                                                          
2 We use a=1, d=0.6 and choose not to report results of different parameter constellations in terms of a and d, 
since a and d appear as a coefficient of (a-d) in sustainability investment and net benefit functions and do not 




Figure 2. The influence of competition on  the sustainability investments for a given spillover rate 
For a given competition rate e.g. θ=1, when the competition rate is higher than the spillover rate the 
leader’s investments increase as the spillover rate increases up to the point when competition and 
spillover rates are equal. A seen in Figure 3 (on the left graph), when the sustainability offerings are 
substitutable, the leader increases her investments and makes the highest investment when competition 
rate exceeds (slightly) the spillover rate. This result is rather counter intuitive. As spill over rate 
increases, we would expect the leader to decrease her sustainability investments in order to prevent the 
followers from free riding. However, when the effect of competition exceeds the effect of spillovers, the 
followers choose not to invest in sustainability, while the leader invests and increases her investments 
even though spillovers increase. The only plausible explanation is that the spillovers only occur in the 
form of improved stakeholder perception toward the whole market, which leads to market expansion.  
In this case, the leader would increase her sustainability investments despite the increasing spillover 
rate, since she would aim to cover the whole market, which expanded due to spillovers in the first place. 
When the sustainability offerings are not substitutable, and the competition rate is lower than the 
spillover rate (𝜃𝜃 < 𝛾𝛾), the leader’s investments are much smaller and show the reverse pattern i.e. they 
decrease as spillover rate increases for a given competition rate. As seen in Figure 3 (on the right graph), 
when the effect of spillovers exceeds the effect of competition as the spillover rate increases, the leader 
decreases her sustainability initiatives and attempts to prevent the first and second followers from free 
riding the sustainability efforts, while the followers increase their sustainability investments.  We can 
infer that when the effect of spillover exceeds the effect of competition, the spillovers also occur in the 




Figure 3. The influence of spillovers on the sustainability investments for a given competition level 
In Figure 4 we observe the investment levels of all players as 𝜃𝜃 and 𝛾𝛾 changes simultaneously. For 𝜃𝜃 >
𝛾𝛾 only the leader invests in sustainability, while the followers do not make any sustainability 
investments. The sustainability investments of the leader are affected negatively by the competition 
level. The leader’s sustainability investments increase with increasing spillover rates, since the leader 
aims to reap all abnormal profits caused by the market expansion due to improved stakeholder 
perception towards the industry. For 𝜃𝜃 = 𝛾𝛾 all players invest in sustainability. Compared to 𝜃𝜃 < 𝛾𝛾 case 
we observe an abrupt decrease in the sustainability investments of the leader. As the competition level 
and spillover rate increase sustainability investments of the leader and first follower decrease, while the 
second follower’s investments remain the same. Compared to 𝜃𝜃 > 𝛾𝛾 case the followers attain the 
minimum amount of investment. 
For 𝜃𝜃 < 𝛾𝛾 all players invest in sustainability. As competition increases all players are discouraged to 
invest in sustainability. As spillover rates increase the leader is compelled to decrease her sustainability 
level to prevent the followers from free riding her sustainability efforts, while the followers invest more 
in sustainability to benefit from accumulating spillovers and reap the abnormal profits. Compared to 
𝜃𝜃 = 𝛾𝛾 case we observe gradual decrease in the sustainability investments of the leader and gradual 
increase for the followers. 
 
Figure 4:The influence of competition level  and spillovers rates on  the sustainability investments 
Next, we identify the conditions under which, the leader, the first follower or the second follower invest 
in sustainability the most and attain advantage in terms of net benefits, under elastic and inelastic 
demand scenarios. In Figure 5, the blue region represents the conditions under which the leader invests 
the most and attains the first mover advantage. We show only the case for b=0.7 since the results are 
22 
 
similar for b=1.7. The green region represents the conditions under which follower 2 invests the most 
and attains the second mover advantage. For θ> γ the leader invests more than both her competitors and 
benefits the most. For θ≤ γ the second follower invests more than the leader and first follower and 
benefits the most. These findings indicate that the first follower has the least incentive to invest in 
sustainability. The leader attains first mover advantage for low spillover rates and moderate to high 
competition levels. However, the leader is not able to retain her first mover advantage as the spillover 
rate increases and the advantage passes to the second follower. For both the elastic and inelastic demand 
cases as the competition level increases, the spillover rate at which the advantage passes from the leader 
to the second follower increases. Thus, for higher competition levels the first mover advantage is more 
defendable. These findings indicate that the first follower has the least incentive to invest in 
sustainability. 
 
Figure 5. The effect of competition and spillover on players, which invest in sustainability  
the most and benefit the most 
 
According to diffusion research3 innovation adopters are classified by time-of-adoption (Rogers, 2003, 
pp. 283): namely: (1) innovator (2) early adopter, (3) early majority, (4) late majority, and (5) laggards. 
The innovator introduces the innovation in to the market and launches the movement. The early adopter 
triggers the critical mass when they adopt an innovation. The early majority adopt the new innovation 
only after they observe that early adopters benefit from the new innovation. Thus, if the early adopter 
does not respond to innovator’s action by taking a similar action, no one else joins the movement and 
the movement dies out.   
The same may apply in the sustainability context. The first follower (early majority in the diffusion 
research context) has a role almost as important as the leader (early adopter in the diffusion research 
context) to spread the sustainability movement. If the first follower does not invest into sustainability, 
the second follower (late majority in the diffusion research context) will not adopt sustainability 
initiatives and sustainability dissemination may become highly unlikely.  
                                                          
3 “The diffusion of innovations is the process by which a few members of a social system initially adopt an 
innovation, then over time more individuals adopt until all (or most) members adopt the new idea.” (Ryan and 
Gross, 1943) “An individual engages in a behavior based on the proportion of people in the social system already 
engaged in the behavior.” (Granovetter, 1978) 
23 
 
If the goal of policy makers is to disseminate sustainability throughout an industry and transform the 
industry, they should give additional incentives to the first followers, since they are at disadvantage in 
terms of financial return as our results suggest and their adoption of sustainability is critical for 
sustainability dissemination. Moving forward we address the effect of competition and sustainability 
spillovers on the sustainability interactions from the policy makers view. 
4.2. The Effect of Competition and Spillover over the Total Market Outcome 
We also consider the effect of competition and sustainability spillovers over on the total market outcome. 
As seen in Figure 6 (part 1), as the competition level increases the total market output for sustainability 
decreases. The total sustainability investments for elastic and inelastic demand have the same pattern 
and differ only in magnitude. Moreover, as spillover rate increases the total market output for 
sustainability increases. The total market sustainability outcome for elastic and inelastic demand differ 
in magnitude; the outcome for the elastic demand case is greater than the outcome for the inelastic 
demand case. Likewise, as seen in Figure 6 (part 2), the cumulative net benefits of the companies 
decrease as the level of competition increases. This decrease is more prominent if spillover effect exists. 
As spillover rate increases the total net benefits of the market increases as well. The total net benefits 
for elastic and inelastic demand differ in magnitude; the net benefit of the total market for the elastic 
demand case is greater than the net benefit of the total market for the inelastic demand case. 
In most circumstances, increasing price which leads to producer surplus does not compensate the 
reduction in consumer surplus. Thus, welfare is lowest if the market price equals the monopoly price 
and highest if it equals the marginal cost of production. Increase competition is more likely to have a 
positive impact on total welfare (Motta, 2004). In the sustainability interactions model the stakeholder 
payment decreases as competition level increases. On the one hand, decreasing stakeholder payments 
cause reduction in producer surplus, which manifests itself as decreasing total net benefit. On the other 
hand, decreasing stakeholder payment cause increase in consumer surplus. If the goal of policy makers 
is to improve economic welfare, they should promote competition.  
 
Figure 6: The effect of competition and spillover on total market outcome regarding sustainability 




Increase in competition level causes decrease in sustainability investments of the total market. Since the 
total sustainability outcome of the market has a positive impact on social and environmental welfare, 
the decrease in total sustainability outcome has negative implications. If the goal of policy makers is to 
promote economic, social and environmental welfare simultaneously, they should regulate competition 
or subsidize companies by tax reduction and compensate the negative influence of competition on the 
total sustainability outcome of the market.  
For the policy maker the spillovers are positive, since they increase the total market output and total net 
benefits regarding sustainability initiatives. Thus, policy makers should incentivize sustainability 
initiatives that transform the market rather than sustainability initiatives, which are company specific 
and hard to imitate.  
5. Conclusion  
We use a game-theoretic framework to understand the interrelated dynamics of sustainability actions of 
companies. We approach sustainability as a market that is shaped by the investments and strategic 
interactions of companies under the assumption of complete information. We propose a sequential 
model where, in the first stage the leader chooses her sustainability level by anticipating the cumulative 
response of multiple followers. In the succeeding stages the followers observe the sustainability 
investments of the leader and the cumulative sustainability outcome of their predecessor followers and 
choose their sustainability investments by anticipating the successor followers’ cumulative 
sustainability levels. Using backward induction, we solve the 1 leader-2 followers game and find the 
unique equilibrium solutions for different ranges of the competition levels and the spillover rates. Using 
a numerical example, we visualize the effect of competition and spillover on the sustainability initiatives, 
net benefits, and total sustainability outcomes of the market.  We identify the conditions, when the first 
mover advantage, second mover advantage or last mover advantage arises.  
The analytical model suggests that the leader has the first mover advantage for 𝜃𝜃 > 𝛾𝛾 and the first mover 
advantage becomes more defendable as the competition increases. For 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 𝛾𝛾 the second follower 
benefits more than the leader. This result is in line with prior empirical research: A leader’s sustainability 
activity is generally lower than her followers’ sustainability activities (Hofer et al., 2012), since the 
leaders are less competitively aggressive, they implement simpler repertoires of actions and realize 
competitive actions more slowly (Ferrier et al., 1999).  
Moreover, the analytical model suggests that either the first mover or the late adopter benefit the most. 
The first mover receives the whole stakeholder payment in the sustainability market, since her 
competitors have not yet invested in sustainability. The late adopter has an advantage, since she benefits 
from cumulative spillovers- increased net benefits due to market expansion caused by improved 
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stakeholder perception of the whole industry and decreased implementation costs. The intermediate 
adopter fails to follow a clear strategy and cannot gain advantage over her competitors.  
Albeit the first follower has the least motivation to invest in sustainability, she has a crucial role to play 
in sustainability dissemination. Thus, the policy makers should incentivize the first follower to invest in 
sustainability. To shed some light on the outcome of sustainability interactions from the policy makers’ 
point of view, we also studied the total market outcome for sustainability. Both the sustainability 
investment and net benefit of the total market for elastic demand are greater in magnitude than the 
sustainability investment and net benefit of the total market for inelastic demand.  Furthermore, 
increasing competition levels decrease the total sustainability investments as well as the total benefits 
of the market, whereas, increasing spillover rates increase the total sustainability investments as well as 
the total benefits of the market. This result leads to the following policy implication for the social 
planner: Incentives should be provided for the sustainability initiatives that transform the total market, 
rather than sustainability initiatives, which are company specific and hard to imitate. 
Future research questions arise such as the decomposition of latent profits into revenue and costs 
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2 = −2𝑏𝑏 < 0 since 𝑏𝑏 > 0. 
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𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2�𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 ,𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿� is strictly concave for any given 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿and 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1. 
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∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2 ,𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿� 
𝜕𝜕Π1𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1�w𝐹𝐹2
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𝜕𝜕2Π𝐹𝐹1
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2 = −�2 − 𝜃𝜃(𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)�𝑏𝑏      
Note that when 𝜃𝜃 ≥ 𝛾𝛾, 0 ≤  𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾 ≤ 1 since 𝜃𝜃 and 𝛾𝛾 are both in [0,1] and since b > 0 by definition, 
−�2 − 𝜃𝜃(𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)�𝑏𝑏 < 0. Similarly, when 𝜃𝜃 < 𝛾𝛾, −1 < 𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾 ≤ 0 since 𝜃𝜃 and 𝛾𝛾 are both in [0,1] 
and since b > 0 by definition, −�2 − 𝜃𝜃(𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)�𝑏𝑏 < 0.  Thus Π𝐹𝐹1
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1�w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2 ,𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿� is strictly 
concave for any given 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿.  
C. Proof of Property 2 
We consider two cases for Follower 1. 
Case C1: We first consider Follower 1’s problem when w𝐹𝐹2






∗ = 0,𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿� = max𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1≥0
𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 �𝑎𝑎 − 𝑏𝑏(𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 + (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿) − 𝑑𝑑�  
Recall from Property 1 that w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 0 when 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2 ≤ 0.  From the definition of 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2, if  𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2 ≤ 0, then 
 𝑎𝑎−𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏
− (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 ≤ (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 .       (C1) 





− (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿� (see (14)).   
Case C1.1.  (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾) > 0 
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Divide both sides of (C1) by (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾) and define 𝑤𝑤�  as follows: 
 𝑤𝑤� = 1(𝜃𝜃−𝛾𝛾) �
𝑎𝑎−𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏
− (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿� ≤ 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1      (C2) 
i) Suppose that �𝑎𝑎−𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏
− (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿� > 0.  Then 𝑤𝑤� > 0.  Based on Remark 2 and the 
definitions of 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 and 𝑤𝑤�   we have, 
 𝑤𝑤� > 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 > 0         (C3) 
Due to (C2) and (C3), 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 is not feasible to Follower 1’s problem in this case.  Due to 
concavity the optimal solution must then be on the boundry. Hence, 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 = 𝑤𝑤�  solves 
Follower 1’s problem (PF1.1) in this case. 
ii) Suppose that �𝑎𝑎−𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏
− (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿� ≤ 0.  Then 𝑤𝑤� < 0.    Based on Remark 3 and the 
definitions of 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 and 𝑤𝑤�   we have, 
 𝑤𝑤� < 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 <  0          (C4) 
Due to (C2) and (C3), 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 is not feasible to Follower 1’s problem in this case.  Due to the 
concavity the optimal solution must then be on the boundry. Hence, 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 = 0 solves Follower 
1’s problem (PF1.1) in this case. 
Case C1.2.  (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾) ≤ 0 
Divide both sides of (C1) by (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾) and define 𝑤𝑤�  as follows: 
  𝑤𝑤� = 1(𝜃𝜃−𝛾𝛾) �
𝑎𝑎−𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏
− (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿� ≥ 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1      (C5) 
i) Suppose that �𝑎𝑎−𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏
− (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿� > 0.  Then 𝑤𝑤� < 0.  Based on Remark 2 and the 
definitions of 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 and 𝑤𝑤�   we have, 
 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 >  0 > 𝑤𝑤�          (C6) 
Due to (C5) and (C6), Follower 1’s problem is infeasible in this case.   
Suppose that �𝑎𝑎−𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏
− (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿� ≤ 0.  Then 𝑤𝑤� ≥ 0.    Based on Remark 3 and the definitions 
of  𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 and 𝑤𝑤�   we have, 
 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 ≤ 0 ≤ 𝑤𝑤�          (C7) 
Due to (C5) and (C7), 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 is not feasible to Follower 1’s problem in this case.  Due to the 
concavity the optimal solution must then be on the boundry. Hence, 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 = 0 solves 
Follower 1’s problem (PF1.1) in this case. 
Case C2: We now consider Follower 1’s problem when w𝐹𝐹2
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− (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿�(see (16)).   
Case C2.1.  (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾) > 0 
Divide both sides of (C8) by (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾) and define 𝑤𝑤�  as follows: 
 𝑤𝑤� = 1(𝜃𝜃−𝛾𝛾) �
𝑎𝑎−𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏
− (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿� > 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1      (C9) 
i) Suppose that �𝑎𝑎−𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏
− (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿� > 0.  Then 𝑤𝑤� > 0.  Based on Remark 2 and the 
definitions of 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 and 𝑤𝑤�   we have, 
 𝑤𝑤� > 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 > 0          (C10) 
Due to (C9) and (C10), 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 is feasible and 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1solves Follower 1’s problem (PF1.2) 
in this case. 
ii) Suppose that �𝑎𝑎−𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏
− (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿� ≤ 0.  Then 𝑤𝑤� < 0. Based on Remark 3 and the 
definitions of 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 and 𝑤𝑤�   we have, 
 𝑤𝑤� <  𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 ≤ 0          (C11) 
Due to (C9) and (C11), Follower 1’s problem is infeasible in this case.   
Case C2.2.  (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾) ≤ 0 
Divide both sides of (C8) by (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾) and define 𝑤𝑤�  as follows: 
𝑤𝑤� = 1(𝜃𝜃−𝛾𝛾) �
𝑎𝑎−𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏
− (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿� < 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1      (C12) 
i) Suppose that �𝑎𝑎−𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏
− (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿� > 0.  Then 𝑤𝑤� < 0.  Based on Remark 2 and the 
definitions of 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 and 𝑤𝑤�   we have, 
  𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 > 0 > 𝑤𝑤�          (C13) 




ii) Suppose that �𝑎𝑎−𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏
− (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿� ≤ 0.  Then 𝑤𝑤� ≥ 0.    Based on Remark 3 and the 
definitions of 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 and 𝑤𝑤�   we have, 
 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 ≤ 0 ≤ 𝑤𝑤�          (C14) 
Due to (C12) and (C14), 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 is not feasible to Follower 1’s problem in this case.  Due to 
the concavity the optimal solution must then be on the boundry. Hence, 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 = 𝑤𝑤� ≥ 0 
solves Follower 1’s problem (PF1.2) in this case.  
 Note that Π𝐹𝐹1
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�0�w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2� ≥ Π𝐹𝐹1
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤��w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2� and Π𝐹𝐹1
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�0�w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2� = 0.  Thus 
Π𝐹𝐹1
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤��w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2� ≤ 0 and 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1 = 0. 
D . Proof of Corollary 1 
Suppose that �𝑎𝑎−𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏
− (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿� > 0.  Then, from Case C 1.1.(i), max𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1≥0
Π𝐹𝐹1
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1�w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 0,𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿� = 𝑤𝑤�   




∗ = 0,𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿� = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1.  Therefore, 
w𝐹𝐹1




∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2�� 
It can be seen by simple comparison that Π𝐹𝐹1
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1�w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2� >  Π𝐹𝐹1
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤��w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 0�, and therefore  
w𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 , w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2    𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 
𝑎𝑎−𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏
− (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 > 0 
Suppose that �𝑎𝑎−𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏
− (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿� ≤ 0.  Then, from Case C 1.2.(ii), w𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 0 and from Case 2.2.(ii) 
w𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 0. Thus, 
w𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 0, w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 0   𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑎𝑎−𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏
− (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 ≤ 0 
E. Concavity of  𝚷𝚷𝑳𝑳𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒖𝒔𝒔�𝒘𝒘𝑳𝑳�𝐰𝐰𝑭𝑭𝟏𝟏
∗ = 𝟎𝟎,𝐰𝐰𝑭𝑭𝟐𝟐
∗ = 𝟎𝟎� 
𝜕𝜕Π𝐿𝐿
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿�w𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 0, w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 0�
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿
= [𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑 − 𝑏𝑏(𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿]− 2𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1    
𝜕𝜕2Π𝐿𝐿
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿�w𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 0, w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 0�
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿2
= −2𝑏𝑏 < 0 since 𝑏𝑏 > 0  
Thus Π𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿�w𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 0, w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 0� is strictly concave. 
Concavity of 𝚷𝚷𝑳𝑳𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒖𝒔𝒔�𝒘𝒘𝑳𝑳�𝐰𝐰𝑭𝑭𝟏𝟏
∗ = 𝒘𝒘�𝑭𝑭𝟏𝟏 ,𝐰𝐰𝑭𝑭𝟐𝟐
∗ = 𝒘𝒘�𝑭𝑭𝟐𝟐�. 
𝜕𝜕Π𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿�w𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 , w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2�
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿
= (𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑) �1− 𝜃𝜃
2(2− 𝜃𝜃) + �4− (2 + 𝜃𝜃)(𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)�
4�2− 𝜃𝜃(𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)�
�
− 2𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 �1− 𝜃𝜃(𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)
2(2−𝜃𝜃) + (4− (2 + 𝜃𝜃)(𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾))






∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 , w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2�
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿2
= −2𝑏𝑏 �1 − 𝜃𝜃(𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾) �2(2−𝜃𝜃)+�4−(2+𝜃𝜃)(𝜃𝜃−𝛾𝛾)�
4�2−𝜃𝜃(𝜃𝜃−𝛾𝛾)�
��   
When 𝜃𝜃 ≥ 𝛾𝛾, 
𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾 ≥ 0 and −𝛾𝛾 ≤ 1 since 𝜃𝜃 and 𝛾𝛾 are both in [0,1], and since 𝑏𝑏 > 0 
2(2 − 𝜃𝜃) + �4 − (2 + 𝜃𝜃)(𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)� > 0 and 4�2 − 𝜃𝜃(𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)� > 0  
𝜃𝜃(𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾) 2(2−𝜃𝜃)+(4−(2+𝜃𝜃)(𝜃𝜃−𝛾𝛾))
4�2−𝜃𝜃(𝜃𝜃−𝛾𝛾)�
> 0      (E1) 
if 1 − 𝜃𝜃(𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾) 2(2−𝜃𝜃)−(𝜃𝜃+2)(𝜃𝜃−𝛾𝛾)+4
4�2−𝜃𝜃(𝜃𝜃−𝛾𝛾)�
 > 0      (E2) 
then −2𝑏𝑏 �(1 − 𝜃𝜃(𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾) 2(2−𝜃𝜃)+(4−(2+𝜃𝜃)(𝜃𝜃−𝛾𝛾))
4�2−𝜃𝜃(𝜃𝜃−𝛾𝛾)�
� < 0 
Since the expression in (E1) is at least a second order polynomial of 𝜃𝜃 and 
since 𝜃𝜃 and 𝛾𝛾 are both in [0,1], the expression in (E2) is true. 
Thus −2𝑏𝑏 �(1 − 𝜃𝜃(𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾) 2(2−𝜃𝜃)+(4−(2+𝜃𝜃)(𝜃𝜃−𝛾𝛾))
4�2−𝜃𝜃(𝜃𝜃−𝛾𝛾)�
� < 0 
When 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 𝛾𝛾,  
𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾 ≤ 0 and 𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾 > −1 since 𝜃𝜃 and 𝛾𝛾 are both in [0,1],  
2(2 − 𝜃𝜃) + �4 − (2 + 𝜃𝜃)(𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)� > 0 and 4�2 − 𝜃𝜃(𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)� > 0  
𝜃𝜃(𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾) 2(2−𝜃𝜃)+(4−(2+𝜃𝜃)(𝜃𝜃−𝛾𝛾))
4�2−𝜃𝜃(𝜃𝜃−𝛾𝛾)�
< 0 and 1 − 𝜃𝜃(𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾) 2(2−𝜃𝜃)+(4−(2+𝜃𝜃)(𝜃𝜃−𝛾𝛾))
4�2−𝜃𝜃(𝜃𝜃−𝛾𝛾)�
> 0 
and since b > 0  
Thus  −2𝑏𝑏 �1 − 𝜃𝜃(𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾) 2(2−𝜃𝜃)−(𝜃𝜃+2)(𝜃𝜃−𝛾𝛾)+4
4�2−𝜃𝜃(𝜃𝜃−𝛾𝛾)�
� < 0. 
Thus Π𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿�w𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 , w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2� is strictly concave for any given 𝛾𝛾,𝜃𝜃, and 𝑏𝑏. 
F. Proof of Property 3 
We consider two cases for the leader. 
Case F.1. 
Suppose that 𝜃𝜃 > 𝛾𝛾. Then, when 
𝑎𝑎−𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏













Also note that 𝑎𝑎−𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏(𝜃𝜃−𝛾𝛾)
> 0 when 𝜃𝜃 > 𝛾𝛾. 




∗ = 0� = [𝑎𝑎 − 𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 − 𝑑𝑑]𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 = (𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 − 𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿2 











 solves the leader’s problem in this case. 
Case F1.2 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 ≥ 0�𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2� 










− (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿����  








 > 0 
  Thus, 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 � 𝑎𝑎−𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏(𝜃𝜃−𝛾𝛾)
,𝑤𝑤�𝐿𝐿�  solves the leader’s problem in this case. 
 






 solves the leader’s problem 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿�𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2� 
Hence we need to compare 
𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 �𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 =
𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏(𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾) �𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 0,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 0�  𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑 𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 = 𝑤𝑤�𝐿𝐿�𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2� 
And since the former is greater than the latter, we have w𝐿𝐿∗ =
𝑎𝑎−𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏(𝜃𝜃−𝛾𝛾)
, in Case F.1 







 solves the leader’s problem 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿�𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2� 
Hence we need to compare 
𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 �𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 =
𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏(𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾) �𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 0,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 0�  𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑 𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 �𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 =
𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏(𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾) �𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2� 
36 
 
Therefore, in Case F.1, 
w𝐿𝐿∗ = 𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 �Π𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 �
𝑎𝑎−𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏(𝜃𝜃−𝛾𝛾) �w𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 0, w
𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 0� ,Π𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 �𝑤𝑤�𝐿𝐿�w𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1, w𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2��  
solves the leader’s problem  
Case F.2. 
Suppose that 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 𝛾𝛾. Then, when 
𝑎𝑎−𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏











Also note that 𝑎𝑎−𝑑𝑑
𝑏𝑏(𝜃𝜃−𝛾𝛾)
< 0 when 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 𝛾𝛾. 
Based on Property 2, Leader’s subproblems become: 
Case F 2.1 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 ≥ 0�𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 0,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 0� = [𝑎𝑎 − 𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 − 𝑑𝑑]𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 = (𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 − 𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿2 




 Since the maximizer 𝑎𝑎−𝑑𝑑
2𝑏𝑏(𝜃𝜃−𝛾𝛾)
< 0, the leader’s problem is infeasible in case F2.1. 
Case F 2.2 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 ≥ 0�𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹1
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹1 ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹2
∗ = 𝑤𝑤�𝐹𝐹2� 










− (𝜃𝜃 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿����  




 In Case F 2.2., the leader’s problem is solved by 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎{0,𝑤𝑤�𝐿𝐿} 
Therefore, in Case F.2,  w𝐿𝐿∗ = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎{0,𝑤𝑤�𝐿𝐿}, solves the leader’s problem. 
